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June 7 2024

Regional Plenum Quo vadis, Balkan? in Sarajevo: Russia and the European Populist Right – Can the Region Escape Russia’s Orbit of Influence?

The fifth Regional Plenum Quo vadis, Balkan? is being held in Sarajevo from June 6 to 8, and, as every year, it will gather a large number of experts, officials, organizations, academic and state institutions, decision-makers, as well as representatives of the media, diplomatic delegations, and the academic community.

This year, the partner of the Regional Academy for Democratic Development from Novi Sad and the Center for Civic Education from Podgorica in organizing the Plenum is the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Sarajevo, and it is realized with the support of the European Fund for the Balkans. The Regional Plenum Quo vadis, Balkan? is one of the most significant regional initiatives that brings together prominent civil society organizations, experts, and activists dealing with the topics of democracy, reconciliation, and regional cooperation.

The fifth panel at this year’s plenum was dedicated to the relationship between Russia and the European populist right. The speakers on the panel were Ljubomir Filipović, political scientist from Montenegro, Prof. Dr. Sead Turčalo, Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sarajevo, Dr. Milivoj Bešlin, historian at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory from Belgrade, and Dr. Harun Karčić, political analyst and journalist from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The panel was moderated by Prof. Dr. Valida Repovac Nikšić from the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Sarajevo.

Ljubomir Filipović assessed that Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans has intensified recently and that it reaches far back into history. He stated that three pillars of this policy were defined long ago – Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its ideological foundation for its idea in a multipolar world.

Sead Turčalo said that it is evident that Russia, through its political discourse, is creating a new reality and that Putin has excellently aligned his narrative with radical right-wing groups in Europe who were disillusioned with liberal democracy. Since 2006, Russia has deliberately begun supporting certain radical right-wing groups in Europe to influence European politics, offering alternative media, and the primary goal of Russia was to disrupt the liberal-democratic consensus in Europe through this approach to specific groups. He noted that this approach required time, resources, and various investments in Western Europe, but in the Western Balkans, this approach required none of these. He emphasized that the region is unique in the sense that Russian influence cannot be analyzed in individual countries but only as a whole, which has allowed Russia to more easily spread its influence.

Milivoj Bešlin said that delving into the dominant narrative of Russia and Serbia would be an important lesson for Europe and that Europe should listen more to its neighbors and critical thinking within these countries. He reminded that when the West did not recognize the danger coming from Vladimir Putin, no one in Europe listened to the warnings coming from countries neighboring Russia, and many remembered it twenty years later when it became obvious that they had been right all along. Speaking about the historical parallels between Russia and Serbia, he first mentioned the state as the ultimate value and the constant attempts to create a state without society and the aspiration to create complete congruence between the state and society. Today, Russia is on the verge of achieving this goal and forcibly equating society with the state. He reminded that in Russian history, the thesis that the state is always older and more important than any individual is well-known, and this is also a characteristic of Serbian and Russian ruling ideology, which implies territorial expansion without any internal development and modernization. The third parallel is the “liberation” argument that exists in our region since the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, implying that Russia or Serbia have moral superiority and the right to rule over neighboring states. Another common narrative is the sense of threat, where our countries are surrounded by enemies, and because of this, they must take measures to protect themselves, with all neighboring states having limited sovereignty. Another common feature is the protection of their people outside their borders, a narrative introduced by Slobodan Milošević. This is the argument Putin completely repeated during the aggression on Ukraine and the pressures on Moldova. The West, of course, is seen extremely negatively in all state ideologies of Russia and Serbia. There is also a narrative of exceptionalism, which in the Russian-Serbian case implies that these countries have their own path, that they must develop in a way opposite to the West and with opposite goals. This creates the concept of the Russian or Serbian world. Another common feature is the church as the guardian of identity and the instrumentalization of the church for political and ideological purposes. The church becomes the center of expansion and aggression, demarcating the space that needs to be occupied. The concept of a party state with one dominant party is another common feature, as is the absence of pluralism and the organic understanding of the people as a whole, where any attempt at pluralization is seen as an attempt to divide. Another shared characteristic is the absence of the separation of powers, as well as violence as a method of governance, pronounced centralism where every complexity of the state is seen as separatism and weakness. State economy instead of market economy, criticism of the government is seen as an attack on the state and is considered subversive, traitorous, and foreign. Historical revisionism is a method that is abused in both societies, and many of these patterns have been adopted by the European populist right from Russia and applied in the European context.

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June 7 2024

Regional Plenum Quo vadis, Balkan? in Sarajevo: The Impact of European and American Elections on the Region – The Western Balkans are Not in the Focus of the Political West

RegionalADD Projects, Projekti 0

The fourth panel at this year’s plenum was dedicated to the impact that European and American elections will have in the Western Balkans. The speakers on the panel were Dr. Srđan Darmanović, professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Montenegro and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Jasmin Mujanović, political scientist from the United States, Prof. Dr. Vesna Pusić, former Minister of European Integration and Foreign Affairs in the Government of Croatia, Dimitrije Milić, political scientist from Serbia, and Adnan Čerimagić, analyst at the European Stability Initiative from Germany. The panel was moderated by Jasmina Kos.

Adnan Čerimagić began his presentation by analyzing the impact of European elections on the region, stating that the key question is whether the European Parliament elections will create conditions for significant reform of the European Union, as the fate of the entire enlargement policy depends on it. The European Parliament elections will have a dual impact – primarily on the confidence of Berlin and Paris, but also on the confidence of other centers in the European Union. Some early results indicate that far-right parties are not achieving as much success as expected, suggesting that the results will be uncertain until the end, and that we will get answers to many questions only on Sunday evening. The election results will significantly influence the decision on who will lead the enlargement policy, which is crucial for the Western Balkans and the policies the EU will adopt towards it. He posed the question of whether the story of European integration is the only story in the region or just one of many. He said that the example of North Macedonia shows the failure of the EU based on democratic reforms, respect for human and minority rights, the rule of law, and strong institutions, and that this failure resulted in the convincing victory of VMRO in the elections a few weeks ago.

Srđan Darmanović, in his opening remarks, said that this is the year of elections in the world, that in some countries like Russia, Belarus, or Azerbaijan, they were held only formally, while in others citizens genuinely decide how they will live. He emphasized that the latest projections show no reason to believe that the EU will drastically change its enlargement policy and that we will not witness a major shake-up in the political landscape of Europe. Regarding the American elections, he said it is likely that a democratic administration would continue with the current policy, but it is clear that many retrograde forces in the region eagerly await Trump’s victory. Speaking about the situation in Montenegro, he said it is under great pressure, but the current power dynamics mean that Serbian nationalist parties do not have a majority in society, although they might enter the government. He emphasized that the government legitimizes itself as pro-European and pro-Western, but the church retains its influence.

Jasmin Mujanović focused on the impact of American elections on the situation in the region. He said it is likely that Biden will win, albeit by a small margin, and that Trump’s victory would be catastrophic for both the US and its position in the world, as well as for all US allies, especially Ukraine. He reminded that regarding the Western Balkans, Biden’s administration has been a major disappointment. In some sense, it represented a continuation of Obama’s policy towards the region, and the Obama administration was characterized by a lack of interest in the Balkans, leading to a deterioration of the situation in all countries of the region under the current Biden administration. He said it is surprising the support the regime in Serbia receives from the US embassy and that it seems there is nothing the Serbian regime can do to show the political West that it is not a partner. Assessing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he said that the real problems are actually official Belgrade and official Zagreb, not Dodik or Čović, and that solutions should be sought there.

Vesna Pusić, commenting on the topic, stated that it is difficult to draw a parallel between European elections and any other elections, as the European Parliament, in terms of jurisdiction and policy-making, is much different from all other parliaments in the world, and that all important decisions are actually made by the European Council. In this sense, she assessed, they are more an indicator of the direction future policies of member states will take, rather than the EU adopting new policies, especially regarding the Western Balkans. Speaking about the US elections, she said that although all criticisms of Biden’s administration and its policy towards the Western Balkans are justified, we must keep in mind that the alternative, that is, Trump’s return to power, is much worse and could mean even war in these regions, and the question of what would happen to the European Union remains. It would be a global tragedy. She also assessed that the beginning of Vučić’s term in 2012 and the opening of negotiations were an opportunity for Serbia to irreversibly move towards European integration, but that chance was missed. She concluded by saying that we must be aware that whenever politicians talk about not allowing Western domination, they are actually trying to create an atmosphere in society that looks at the entire system of democratic governance with suspicion.

Dimitrije Milić said that the policy of balancing in Serbia’s foreign policy began in 2008 when the economic crisis started and when economic conditions opened the door for other influences, primarily Chinese. Non-Western and undemocratic actors took advantage of the opportunity presented to them, and this was aided by the electorate in Serbia turning to anti-Westernism or Euroscepticism, pro-Russian sentiment, which limited the political elites’ room to offer a purely pro-European story. At its core is the perception that has existed in Serbia since the 1990s, that the liberal world order is aimed solely at harming Serbia and that it just needs to wait for this order to collapse.

ryde-research-western-balkans-youth-in-policy-making-processes

January 31 2024

Western Balkans Youth in Policy Making Processes – Research Results

RegionalADD Projects, Projekti 0

Research on the Attitudes of civil society organisations and young people

This research on the youth policies and policy-making processes in the Western Balkans has been conducted as part of the regional project entitled Regional Youth Dialogue for Europe – RYDE. The project is financed by the European Union. The goal of the project is to contribute to strengthening the participatory democracy of European integration and regional cooperation in the Western Balkans by increasing the influence of civil society organisations (CSOs), youth organisations in particular, in promoting democratic values and the political, economic and social benefits of the European integration of the Western Balkans.

The aim of the research is to increase overall awareness by collecting relevant data concerning youth policies and social investment in the Western Balkans. The research provides an analysis of the current viewpoints held by both youth organisations and youths themselves, regarding youth policies in this region. The research covers six economies: Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia.

The research team consisted of paired senior and junior experts from all of the covered economies, with the exception of Montenegro (which was covered by a researcher from Serbia).

The focus of the research was to collect data on the attitudes toward existing youth policies, approaches to improving youth policies at local/national/ regional levels and the priorities of vulnerable youth groups in respective policies. Both youth CSOs and young people (civic and political activists, policy-makers, journalists, scholars, etc.) participated in the research.

Following this, two complementary surveys were conducted concurrently in all economies – one focusing on youth organisations through interviews, and the other on a broader spectrum of stakeholders, through an online survey. From August – October 2023, a total of 151 interviews with CSO representatives were conducted in the Western Balkans economies. The interviews were followed by an online survey conducted throughout October and November 2023. The survey included 1,366 youth individuals in these economies. Both surveys aimed to assess the state of youth policies, their effectiveness, and the perspectives of those engaged in youth-related activities. (…)

This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

DOWNLOAD: Western Balkans Youth in Policy Making Processes – Research on the Attitudes of civil society organisations and young people

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The Regional Youth Dialogue for Europe Project is implementing by the Center for Democracy Foundation (CDF), Belgrade (as project coordinator) and partner organizations: Academy of European Integration and Negotiations from Tirana (AIEN); Kosovo Stability Initiative from Pristina (IKS); Association Network of Progressive Initiatives from Sarajevo (NPI); NGO Info Center from Skopje (NGO IC); Regional Academy for Democratic Development from Novi Sad (ADD); Youth Act Center from Tirana (YA). The project is funded by the European Union.

January 31 2024

Western Balkans Youth in Policy Making Processes

RegionalADD Projects, Projekti 0

Research on the Attitudes of civil society organisations and young people

January 2024

The research team consisted of paired senior and junior experts from all of the covered economies, with the exception of Montenegro (which was covered by a researcher from Serbia).

This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

You can see the publication HERE: ryde-research-western-balkans-youth-in-policy-making-processes

January 29 2024

Hate Speech and Tolerant Political Culture in the Public Space of the Western Balkans

RegionalADD Projects, Projekti, Uncategorized 0

By: Aleksandra Jerkov, PhD

This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Regional Academy for Democratic Development and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Introduction

Hate speech in the Western Balkans has become a pressing concern, particularly as the region continues to navigate the complex process of reconciliation and integration after a tumultuous history marked by ethnic conflicts and political upheaval. The term ‘hate speech’ in this context refers to any form of communication that disparages a person or a group based on some characteristic such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, or other aspects that might trigger conflict.

In the Western Balkans, a region characterized by its ethnic and cultural diversity, hate speech has been identified as a significant barrier to fostering a political culture of tolerance and inclusion. Despite the progress made since the conflicts of the 1990s, the legacy of division still influences the public and political discourse, making the task of cultivating a culture of respect and understanding all the more critical.

Hate speech not only poses a threat to individual rights and social cohesion but also undermines democratic processes and the rule of law. It can lead to an environment where inflammatory rhetoric becomes normalized, which in turn can erode trust in public institutions and fuel cycles of retaliation and violence. This has particular relevance in the Western Balkans, where the balance between free expression and maintaining social harmony is often delicate.

The public space in the Western Balkans thus becomes a critical arena for addressing the issue of hate speech. It is here that the contest between perpetuating a divisive narrative and promoting a tolerant political culture is most visible. The region’s path toward greater European integration provides both an impetus and a framework for addressing hate speech, as adherence to European values necessitates a commitment to human rights, including the right to be free from hate speech.

Understanding the nature of hate speech in the Western Balkans, its impacts on society, and the efforts to counteract it are essential steps toward building a more tolerant and democratic region. This blog post aims to delve into these issues, offering a comprehensive overview of the current state of hate speech and its implications for the political culture in the Western Balkans.

The primary aim of this blog is to explore the intricate relationship between hate speech and the political culture within the Western Balkans. This examination is not only about identifying the presence and patterns of hate speech within the region but also understanding how it interacts with and influences the political culture, public discourse, and daily interactions among diverse communities.

In this context, hate speech is not just seen as an isolated phenomenon but rather as a symptom and a catalyst of the broader political dynamics in the region. The blog will delve into how hate speech can reflect deep-seated historical grievances, current political tensions, and societal divisions. Moreover, it will investigate the ways in which hate speech can both shape and be shaped by political narratives, media representations, and legislative frameworks in the Western Balkans.

This exploration will encompass an analysis of the tools and strategies employed by political entities, civil society organizations, and international bodies to combat hate speech and promote a culture of tolerance and dialogue. It will also address the effectiveness of these approaches and the challenges that lie ahead in nurturing a political culture that is resilient to the divisive effects of hate speech.

Understanding this relationship is crucial for anyone interested in the progress of the Western Balkans towards greater stability, peace, and integration with the wider European community. Through this blog, we aim to contribute to the ongoing conversation about building an inclusive and respectful political environment that can withstand the challenges posed by hate speech.

Background Information

The Western Balkans, comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, is a region rich in cultural and political diversity, shaped by its complex history. Historically, this region has been a crossroads of different civilizations, which has contributed to its rich cultural tapestry. Empires such as the Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian have left their mark, creating a mosaic of ethnicities, religions, and languages. Political diversity is equally pronounced, with the region housing a range of political systems and ideologies over the past century. The 20th century, in particular, saw the rise and fall of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The fall of communism and the subsequent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s led to a series of conflicts known as the Yugoslav Wars. These wars were marked by severe ethnic tensions and instances of genocide and ethnic cleansing, leaving a legacy of mistrust and division that still lingers.

The recent history of the Western Balkans is one of trying to overcome the deep-seated prejudices and animosities that the wars of the 1990s reinforced. The conflicts exacerbated historical grievances and created new ones, often manifested through hate speech and nationalist rhetoric. The legacy of these conflicts has been a significant factor in the political life of the region, influencing both domestic policies and international relations.

Efforts towards reconciliation and fostering regional cooperation have been ongoing, with the European Union playing a central role in promoting stability and democratic standards. Despite these efforts, the region still grapples with nationalism and ethnic divisions, which are sometimes inflamed by political leaders seeking to exploit these sentiments for political gain.

The prejudices and biases rooted in the region’s recent conflicts pose a persistent challenge. Hate speech, often a reflection of these prejudices, continues to be a tool for political mobilization and a barrier to the establishment of a more tolerant political culture. These dynamics make the Western Balkans a compelling case study for examining the relationship between hate speech, political culture, and efforts to build inclusive societies. Understanding this historical context is crucial for any analysis of hate speech and its impact on the region’s progress toward peace and integration.

For the purpose of this paper, we will use the definition which considers hate speech to be any form of expression that spreads, incites, promotes or justifies hatred, violence and discrimination against a person or group based on race, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or national origin. The nature of hate speech is often inflammatory and derogatory, with the intention to demean and dehumanize the targeted group, contributing to a climate of hostility and potentially inciting real-world violence and discrimination.

The legal implications of hate speech are complex and vary from country to country in the Western Balkans, as well as globally. In many jurisdictions, hate speech is a criminal offense when it incites violence or discrimination. However, balancing the restrictions on hate speech with the fundamental right to freedom of expression can be challenging. Legal frameworks in the Western Balkans often reflect international standards and agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which seek to protect both individual rights to free speech and public order.

Social implications of hate speech are profound and far-reaching. It can lead to increased tensions between different community groups, contribute to a climate of fear and hostility, and undermine social cohesion. Hate speech can also have a silencing effect on its targets, restricting their ability to participate fully in public life. In the context of the Western Balkans, where societies are still recovering from recent conflicts, hate speech can threaten the fragile peace and reconciliation processes, reignite old animosities, and impede the region’s path towards European integration and cooperation.

Therefore, understanding the dynamics of hate speech, its legal boundaries and social consequences, is pivotal in shaping policies and educational programs that aim to promote a culture of tolerance and respect for human rights within the Western Balkans.

Current State of Hate Speech in the Western Balkans

Hate speech in the political arena of the Western Balkans often manifests in nationalist rhetoric, which sometimes escalates during election cycles or in the midst of political crises. Politicians and public figures have been known to use divisive language to rally support, targeting ethnic, religious, or national groups. This can include derogatory comments aimed at neighboring countries or minority populations within their own borders.

One of the examples of this is the most recent statement of the President of Croatia Zoran Milanovic, who stated on December 30 2023: “Bosnia and Herzegovina is a clumsy, sloppy, incompetently led colony” (“Bosna i Hercegovina je trapava, traljava, nesposobno vođena kolonija”)[1]. The examples of this type of hate speech also include constant and persistent use of term “shiptar” for persons of Albanian nationality in Serbia, although it is highly offensive. This term is used widely in Serbia in public discourse by politicians, media, officials and on internet, although in 2018, the Serbian judiciary determined that the term ‘šiptar’ is offensive and designated as hate speech.

Everlasting bilateral conflicts or disputes in the region, as well as olitical debates around issues such as the status of Kosovo*, the representation of ethnic minorities in government, or immigration can sometimes lead to hate speech. Political leaders may resort to inflammatory language to strengthen in-group solidarity among their supporters, at times using historical grievances or stereotypes to vilify the out-group.

It is also not uncommon for media outlets with strong political affiliations to echo and amplify hate speech, thus giving it a wider audience. Social media, too, plays a significant role in spreading such rhetoric, with the anonymity and reach of digital platforms making it easier for hate speech to circulate and gain traction. The spread of hate speech through popular culture is a common occurrence. Croatian singer Marko Perković Thompson is among the mainstream performers in Croatia, even though his songs glorify Ustasha crimes and call for the expulsion and killing of Serbs. Songs that glorify convicted war criminals are a common occurrence in Serbia and have become almost a usual part of celebrations and festivities. In June 2022, social networks were flooded with a video of the end-of-school-year celebration at an elementary school in Novi Sad, where a teacher played the song ‘Ne volim te Alija zato što si Balija’ (I do not like you Alija, because you are Balija (offensive term for Bosniaks) to ten-year-olds, and pop-folk performers like Baja Mali Knindža have been filling halls and squares for years and are among the most popular in Serbia, even though they sing songs like “Moj je tata zlocinac iz rata” (my dad is a war criminal) and similar.

These instances of hate speech can have a chilling effect on inter-ethnic relations and undermine efforts to build a stable and cohesive political culture. They can lead to discrimination against minority groups, hinder the integration process, and potentially incite violence.

Monitoring organizations and civil society groups in the Western Balkans often document these incidents and work to hold political figures accountable. Latest reports warn about the situation with hate speech in Western Balkans.[2] What is particularly worrying is the fact that, although hate speech is legally prohibited in all countries of the Western Balkans, these examples, as well as statements by officials, go unsanctioned, and some have become so common that they often remain without significant public condemnation.

Social and Political Impact of Hate Speech

In the Western Balkans, where societies are still healing from the wounds of past conflicts, the impact of hate speech is even more pronounced. It can reinforce historical prejudices and interrupt the process of reconciliation.

Social Impact:

Erosion of Social Cohesion: Hate speech can drive wedges between different groups within society, eroding the sense of community and shared identity. It can fuel suspicion, fear, and hostility, leading to social segregation and isolation of targeted groups.

Normalization of Prejudice: Repeated exposure to hate speech can normalize bigotry and discrimination. This is particularly concerning when such speech comes from public figures or is disseminated through popular culture, as it may influence societal norms and behaviors.

Psychological Harm: Individuals and groups targeted by hate speech can suffer significant psychological harm, including increased anxiety, stress, and a feeling of unsafety. This can lead to lower self-esteem and hinder their ability to participate fully in society.

Violence and Intimidation: Hate speech can incite violence and acts of intimidation against marginalized or vulnerable groups, leading to a climate of fear and sometimes resulting in physical harm or even death.

Political Impact

Polarization: Hate speech can polarize political debates, making it more difficult to reach consensus or engage in constructive dialogue. It can turn political discourse into a ‘zero-sum game’ where the success of one group is seen as coming at the expense of another.

Undermining Democracy: For a democracy to function effectively, it requires a certain level of civil discourse. Hate speech undermines the democratic process by silencing voices, spreading misinformation, and reducing the capacity for rational debate.

Legitimization of Extremist Views: When hate speech is not adequately addressed, it can lead to the legitimization and empowerment of extremist groups and ideologies, which may gain a foothold in mainstream politics.

Impact on Policy Making: Hate speech can influence the development of policies and laws, especially if it becomes a tool for political gain. Politicians may be swayed to adopt hardline positions or enact legislation that discriminates against certain groups to appease constituents influenced by hate speech.

Tolerant Political Culture: Challenges and Opportunities

A tolerant political culture in the Western Balkans, a region marked by its rich historical layers and complex interethnic relations, implies the creation of a political landscape where debate and disagreement occur within a framework of mutual respect and understanding. This is particularly significant in a region where the legacy of conflict and the deep-seated historical narratives of ethnic and national identity have often been sources of tension.

In the Western Balkans, fostering tolerance means actively working against the currents of past animosities and prejudices that have long divided its people. It involves building a political discourse that is inclusive, one that not only tolerates but also celebrates the cultural and ethnic diversity that each nation within the region possesses. It is about nurturing a culture where political actors and the general populace are educated on and mindful of the language they use, the historical contexts they operate within, and the potential impact their words and actions have on the delicate fabric of their society.

A tolerant political culture here does not imply a mere passive coexistence or the mere absence of conflict. Rather, it denotes an active engagement in democratic practices that protect minority opinions, uphold human rights, and encourage participation from all sectors of society. It is about creating institutional mechanisms that not only prevent hate speech and discrimination but also promote policies that ensure equitable treatment for all, regardless of ethnic background, religious belief, or political affiliation.

In the Western Balkans, where memories of the wars of the 1990s are still fresh in the collective memory, the challenges to establishing such a culture are considerable. The media, educational institutions, and political leaders have a particularly pivotal role to play. Media must strive to be impartial and resist serving as a platform for divisive rhetoric. Education should aim to impart not only knowledge but also empathy, teaching new generations about the region’s diverse heritage in a way that fosters an inclusive identity. Political leaders, meanwhile, have the responsibility to lead by example, to demonstrate that it is possible to hold firm to one’s convictions while still extending dignity and respect to one’s opponents.

Fostering a tolerant political culture in the Western Balkans faces unique challenges, deeply rooted in the region’s recent history as well as its long-standing cultural and national narratives. One of the primary challenges is the legacy of conflict, which left behind a complex web of unresolved issues and grievances. The wars of the 1990s, in particular, have left a profound imprint on the collective consciousness, and the resultant trauma can often be a barrier to building a culture of tolerance.

Another significant challenge is the prevalence of nationalist sentiments, which can be exploited by political figures to gain or maintain power. Nationalist rhetoric often relies on portraying ‘the other’ in negative terms, which can entrench division rather than promote the understanding needed for a tolerant society.

Additionally, the region’s media landscape often reflects and amplifies these divisions. Media outlets sometimes act as echo chambers for hate speech and divisive rhetoric, rather than as conduits for the kind of balanced and fair discourse that could foster tolerance.

Moreover, education systems in some parts of the Western Balkans have not fully addressed the need for curricula that promote critical thinking, empathy, and a nuanced understanding of the region’s diverse history. Without this, younger generations may inherit the biases and prejudices that continue to challenge social cohesion.

Political institutions in the region also face the daunting task of ensuring fair representation and equal treatment for all ethnic and religious groups. In some cases, these institutions themselves may be perceived as biased or untrustworthy, which can undermine efforts to develop a tolerant political culture.

Lastly, the efforts to integrate into the European Union provide both a framework and an incentive for fostering tolerance, but they also present challenges. The EU’s criteria require significant reforms and the development of inclusive policies, which can sometimes be met with resistance from those who see these changes as threats to national sovereignty or identity.

These challenges require a multifaceted approach that includes political will, educational reform, responsible media, and ongoing engagement with civil society. Overcoming them is essential for the Western Balkans to build societies where diversity is not only tolerated but valued as a strength, and where political culture can thrive on the principles of democracy and mutual respect.

Efforts to Combat Hate Speech

Efforts to reduce hate speech in the Western Balkans have been multifaceted and involve various stakeholders, including governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international bodies. These efforts recognize the importance of addressing hate speech to promote social cohesion, stability, and progress in the region. Here are some of the key initiatives and approaches:

Government Initiatives:

Legal Frameworks: Governments in the Western Balkans have put in place legal frameworks that define hate speech, incitement to violence, and discrimination as criminal offenses. These laws provide a basis for prosecuting individuals and groups engaged in hate speech.

National Action Plans: Some governments have developed National Action Plans against Hate Speech, outlining strategies for prevention, protection, and prosecution. These plans often involve collaboration with civil society organizations and international partners.

Media Regulation: Efforts have been made to regulate media content to prevent the dissemination of hate speech. This includes monitoring and holding media outlets accountable for promoting hate speech.

Education: Governments have introduced educational programs aimed at promoting tolerance, diversity, and critical thinking in schools. These programs seek to counteract the influence of hate speech on young minds.

NGO Initiatives:

Monitoring and Reporting: NGOs in the Western Balkans play a crucial role in monitoring hate speech and documenting incidents. They provide platforms for individuals to report hate speech, and their reports often inform policy discussions.

Education and Awareness: NGOs conduct awareness campaigns and educational programs focused on countering hate speech. They work with schools, communities, and online platforms to promote tolerance and respectful dialogue.

Legal Support: Some NGOs offer legal support to individuals or groups who are victims of hate speech or discrimination. They help victims navigate the legal system and seek justice.

International Efforts:

European Union: The EU has been actively engaged in promoting tolerance and countering hate speech in the Western Balkans. Accession to the EU is linked to compliance with democratic values, including the protection of minority rights and freedom of expression.

OSCE: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has a presence in the region and works on issues related to hate speech and tolerance. They provide expertise, conduct training, and support civil society initiatives.

United Nations: UN bodies, such as UNDP and UNICEF, collaborate with governments and NGOs to promote tolerance, youth engagement, and conflict prevention in the region.

Council of Europe: The Council of Europe also plays a role in promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the Western Balkans. It supports efforts to combat hate speech and discrimination through various programs and initiatives.

These efforts, while important, still face challenges, including the need for more effective implementation of existing laws, addressing political and institutional biases, and countering the influence of extremist ideologies. However, the commitment of governments, civil society, and international partners to combating hate speech is a positive step toward building a more inclusive and tolerant Western Balkans.

The effectiveness of measures to reduce hate speech in the Western Balkans varies, and their impact can be influenced by several factors.

Legal Frameworks defining hate speech as a criminal offense have the potential to be effective in discouraging overt hate speech and providing legal recourse for victims. However, their effectiveness can be hindered by uneven enforcement and the reluctance to prosecute high-profile individuals or public figures. Additionally, the challenge lies in defining hate speech within legal parameters, with the risk of potential misuse for political purposes.

National Action Plans against hate speech can be valuable in coordinating efforts across government agencies and civil society. They promote a comprehensive approach to combating hate speech. Yet, their effectiveness depends on their implementation and adequate funding. Regular monitoring of progress and adjusting strategies is essential for continued success.

Regulations aimed at preventing hate speech in the media have the potential to discourage its dissemination and encourage responsible reporting. However, achieving a balance between protecting freedom of the press and preventing hate speech can be challenging. Media ownership structures and political influence can hinder effective regulation.

Educational programs focused on promoting tolerance, diversity, and critical thinking in schools are crucial for countering the influence of hate speech on young minds. These programs have the potential to shape future generations with more inclusive values. However, their long-term impact may take time to become evident.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) play a vital role in monitoring hate speech, providing platforms for reporting, conducting awareness campaigns, and offering legal support to victims. Their effectiveness varies depending on their reach and resources.

International efforts, including those from the European Union, OSCE, United Nations, and Council of Europe, are instrumental in promoting tolerance and countering hate speech. They provide expertise, training, and support to regional governments and civil society organizations.

In assessing the overall effectiveness of these measures, it is crucial to acknowledge that reducing hate speech is a complex and ongoing process. Success hinges on collaborative efforts, consistent implementation, public awareness, and adaptation to evolving challenges. Additionally, addressing the root causes of hate speech, such as historical grievances and societal divisions, is essential for sustainable progress.

Future Outlook

Looking ahead to the future of political culture in the Western Balkans regarding hate speech, several trends and areas for improvement emerge:

Gradual Improvement: The region is expected to see gradual improvements in its political culture concerning hate speech. Efforts to combat hate speech, especially those aligned with European Union accession requirements, will continue to push for greater tolerance and respect for diversity.

Lingering Challenges: Historical grievances and ethnic tensions are likely to persist, and some segments of the population may resist change, particularly during times of political or economic uncertainty. These deep-rooted issues will require sustained efforts to address.

Youth as Agents of Change: Younger generations, growing up in a more interconnected world, may become key drivers of change. Their exposure to global perspectives and access to information can lead to more open-minded attitudes, making them instrumental in fostering tolerance.

Media Responsibility: The role of the media will remain pivotal. Media outlets that prioritize responsible reporting and refrain from sensationalism can contribute significantly to a healthier political culture. However, addressing media ownership and influence will continue to be a challenge.

Civil Society’s Influence: Civil society organizations will continue to play a vital role in monitoring hate speech, advocating for tolerance, and holding authorities accountable. Their impact will depend on their ability to mobilize public opinion and engage with diverse communities.

To further promote a tolerant political culture in the Western Balkans, several measures can be taken:

Strengthen Legal Frameworks: Governments should focus on enhancing and enforcing legal frameworks against hate speech, ensuring that they are comprehensive and effectively implemented. This includes penalties for hate speech and mechanisms to address online hate speech.

Education for Tolerance: Educational programs should be expanded to promote tolerance, diversity, and critical thinking in schools. These programs should address historical narratives and encourage empathy and understanding among students.

Media Regulation and Ethics: Media regulation should be refined to strike a balance between freedom of the press and preventing hate speech. Encouraging responsible journalism and media ethics is essential.

Promote Interethnic Dialogue: Initiatives that facilitate interethnic dialogue and cooperation can help bridge divides and foster understanding among different communities.

Youth Engagement: Engaging youth in initiatives that promote tolerance and intercultural understanding is crucial. Youth-led projects and platforms can empower young people to be advocates for change.

Regional Cooperation: Collaborative efforts among Western Balkan countries, with support from international organizations like the European Union and the Council of Europe, can strengthen the collective resolve to combat hate speech and promote a more tolerant political culture.

Overall, the path toward a more tolerant political culture in the Western Balkans is a journey that requires persistence, collaboration, and a multifaceted approach involving governments, civil society, media, and the active participation of citizens.

Conclusion

Throughout this blog, we have journeyed through various facets of hate speech, from its definition and legal implications to its societal consequences. We have delved into the historical context of the Western Balkans, unveiling the enduring legacy of conflicts and prejudices that continue to shape the region’s political landscape. Through the examination of recent examples, we have witnessed the persistence of hate speech within the political sphere of the Western Balkans, a stark reminder of the challenges that lie ahead. We have also analyzed how hate speech acts as a catalyst for polarization, erodes trust in institutions, and poses the unsettling potential for violence.

In essence, this blog reinforces the message that addressing hate speech is not merely a matter of legal compliance; it is an imperative for the health and stability of the Western Balkans. By combatting hate speech, the region can embark on a transformative journey towards fostering a more inclusive, tolerant, and harmonious political culture.

As we look towards the future, it is clear that the path to change will not be without its challenges. Historical grievances and ethnic tensions may persist, but the role of the younger generation, civil society, responsible media, and international cooperation offers hope for a more positive trajectory.

In conclusion, this blog advocates for a collective commitment to combat hate speech, for it is through such concerted efforts that the Western Balkans can truly embrace a political culture founded on the principles of democracy, mutual respect, and unity in diversity.

References and Further Reading

Reports and Publications:

“Hate Speech and Incitement to Violence in the Western Balkans: A Regional Overview” – United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
“Media and Hate Speech in the Western Balkans” – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
“Freedom of Expression, Hate Speech, and Propaganda: Monitoring and Analysing Media Content in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia” – ARTICLE 19

Academic Research:

“Hate Speech in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Problem and the Solutions” – Selma Porobić (Journal of Hate Studies)
“Media and Hate Speech in the Western Balkans: The Role of the Media in the Spread of Hate Speech in the Western Balkans” – Branislav Radeljić (Southeast European and Black Sea Studies)

Government and NGO Resources:

Council of Europe – Official Website
European Union – Enlargement and Stabilization Process
OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina – Media Development

Books:

“Ethnic Conflict and Hate Speech in the Balkans: The Influence of Nationalism” – Norbert Bugeja
“Media, Ethnicity and Nationalism in the European Context” – Janusz Bugajski

Articles and News Sources:

“The Balkans, Where Hate Speech Flourishes” – Balkan Insight
“Hate Speech and Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Overview” – Al Jazeera Balkans

Civil Society Organizations:

Human Rights Watch – Balkans
Amnesty International – Balkans

[1] https://bosnae.info/index.php/milanovic-ponovo-ponizava-bih-bosna-i-hercegovina-je-trapava-traljava-nesposobno-vodjena-kolonija , visited on January 15, 2024

[2] https://mc.rs/rezultati-monitoringa-seksizam-govor-mrznje-i-mizoginija-najprisutniji-u-zapadno-balkanskim-medijima/za-medije/detaljno/1215 , visited on January 15, 2024

January 25 2024

Navigating the EU Youth Dialogue and Strengthening Youth Decision-Making in Serbia

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Regional Youth Dialogue for Europe Project

The EU Youth Dialogue (EUYD), formerly known as Structured Dialogue, is a mechanism implemented at the European Union (EU) level to address youth issues and needs. Through this dialogue, decision-makers gain insight into the concerns and demands of young people, enabling them to make informed decisions that are in the best interest of the youth. Simply put, the EUYD provides a platform for young people to participate in the political decision-making process and make their voices heard.

Aligned with the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2027, EUYD supports its implementation and encourages cooperation between EU countries on issues relating to young people with a primary focus on three core areas – connect, engage, and empower. Each dialogue cycle lasts for 18 months and focuses on one topic related to one of the 11 European Youth Goals. Guiding the implementation of the EUYD Trio Presidency closely cooperates with the European Commission, the National Agencies, the European Youth Forum and other non-governmental youth organizations, within a coordination group. Throughout the cycle, input from young people is gathered on all levels and through different forms of consultations such as EU youth conferences, Europe-wide surveys, nationwide events, different projects and local events.

The EU Youth Conference is the key event and is organized twice a year by the country holding the EU Presidency. During the conferences, young people, policy-makers, as well as experts, researchers and representatives of civil society work together, compile the results of the EUYD activities and develop common messages to the EU. The Council of the EU may adopt a policy document based on these outputs aimed at improving the position of young people across the EU.

The 10th cycle called “We Need Youth” runs from July 1, 2023, to December 31, 2024, under the presidency of Spain, Belgium, and Hungary. It is focused on implementing Youth Goal #3 “Inclusive societies” and aims to youth engagement, foster inclusivity, and celebrate the dialogue’s achievements.

Western Balkans Youth Lab: Paving the Way for Inclusive Decision-Making

Unfortunately, young people and policy-makers from the EU candidate countries are excluded from this process. To bridge this gap Regional Cooperation Council kicked off Western Balkans Youth Lab (WBYL), an EU-funded project which aims to provide opportunities for youth to participate in decision-making in the Western Balkans (WB).

WBYL is based on the EUYD methodology and it strives to create a long-term structured regional dialogue between youth organisations and national administrations, focusing on jointly developing policies which increase youth participation in decision-making, youth mainstreaming of policies, and improve the overall socio-economic environment and mobility of youth in the WB economies.

Since 2020, two Youth Policy Labs have been implemented. The first one on Youth Unemployment, and the second on Youth Mental Health. In the beginning, young people and policymakers from the Western Balkans 6, including Serbia underwent training on the Methodology and Model, which was followed by the establishment of the Regional and National Pool of Experts. The experts were provided with opportunities to convene through both online and offline meetings, as well as Mid-Term and Final Conferences, with the goal of co-designing programs and policies relevant to young people.

Structuring the EU Youth Dialogue in Serbia

For the last four years, Serbia has been a clear leader in the implementation of the EUYD outside the EU borders and as such, should serve as a focal point for the region (and other candidate countries), providing valuable insight into how different aspects of the mechanisms can be implemented in the candidate countries.

Two programmes led by the National Youth Council of Serbia (KOMS), on the national and local levels, are based on the EUYD methodology. On the national level, since 2019, KOMS has conducted dialogues with young people and key decision-makers such as the Youth Dialogue with the Prime Minister, the (former) Minister for Youth and Sports, and other actors such as the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality. These dialogues provide space for young people to point out the challenges they face in Serbia, and propose concrete, evidence-based measures to solve them. On the local level, KOMS implements a programme named “Odlučionice”. The programme connects representatives of Local Self-government Units (municipalities and cities), student parliaments, and civil society organizations which undergo joint training learning about youth policy, activism, and youth participation in local communities. Upon that, they become part of the network of local coordinators for dialogue with young people working to improve the cooperation between young people and decision-makers. The local coordinators begin their joint work by implementing a community initiative created through the program.

To further standardize the implementation in Serbia, the Permanent Expert Team on the EUYD was established in 2021. The Team is based on the model of the National Working Groups for the implementation of the EUYD which are established in the EU member states to coordinate youth policies and standardized practices for involving young people in decision-making processes. Representatives of the Ministry of Tourism and Youth, the Ministry of European Integration, the National Association of Youth Workers, the Tempus Foundation, and KOMS are represented in the Permanent Expert Team. An intersectoral coordination group, which only EU member states have, represents an important step and the potential for youth and their active participation. Its institutionalization within the Advisory Youth Council of the Government of the Republic of Serbia ensures that youth recommendations are the key element for the development of youth and other relevant policies.

Dialogue Implementation in Serbia – A Deep Dive into the Challenges

The EUYD implies active participation in decision-making processes, which is based on the principle of co-management. Young people and decision-makers discuss youth-relevant topics in a structured way and agree on potential solutions. This kind of dialogue is often absent in local communities, and the existing mechanisms (if they exist) are often not utilized in reality, hence not fulfilling their role. According to data on local youth policy published by KOMS in 2021, indicates that 54.5% of the local Advisory Youth Councils, as instruments of local youth policy, are not functional or inclusive in the vast majority of Local Self-Governing Units. If we observe other perimeters, we can conclude that local decision-makers often do not prioritize challenges young people face, and they do not give enough attention to them in the process of creating public policies.

Youth Dialogues on local and national level in Serbia receive only project-based funding through KOMS, which has to re-apply for the funds each year. This practice does not guarantee their implementation in the future, which is potentially extremely harmful to the quality of information gathered for the EUYD, but also to the space for civil society and the culture of dialogue in Serbia. The dialogues have produced concrete results in the past, including the “My F irst S alary” programme, the decision not to terminate the operations of student polyclinics in Serbia, as well as several accomplishments in the process of the adoption of the new National Strategy on Youth. However, monitoring the steps the decision-makers choose to take after the dialogues remains difficult to conduct.

Mapping Out the Road Ahead: The Future of the EU Youth Dialogue (in Serbia)

During the first conference of the 10th cycle, an evaluation of the mechanism has been announced. This news was warmly welcomed, especially by the young delegates, since the monitoring of the results of the process is something common throughout all levels of implementation. The delegates themselves have formed a working group to address the need to enhance the transparency of the decision-making process regarding the youth on the EU level.

One of the key challenges for the implementation of the EUYD mechanism in Serbia has been the above-mentioned lack of integration of candidate countries. In that instance, the members of the Permanent Expert Team seldom received invitations to take part in the EU Youth Dialogue cycles on the EU level, including the above-mentioned EU Youth Conferences. However, youth representatives of the Permanent Expert Team have been invited to take part in the second EU Youth Conference 2023 in Alicante, Spain which represents a significant step forward.

The EUYD itself has a long road of further improvement ahead. From the perspective of Serbia, and all other candidate countries, this process must include all of us, at all levels of implementation. This builds the advocacy capacities of young people but also prepares the representatives of decision-makers for their responsibilities as future members of the EU.

Author: Anja Jokić, MA in Political Science and Youth Activist

Co-author: Maša Vračar, BA in International Relations and Youth Activist

* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

January 23 2024

Is there any progress in Western Balkan economies in implementing the Youth Guarantee programme?

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Regional Youth Dialogue for Europe Project

Over the last few years, the youth unemployment rate has continuously decreased in all WB economies. However, it varies from economy to economy and remains higher compared to EU member states. The highest youth unemployment rate is in North Macedonia, at 34.9%, while the lowest is in Kosovo* – 21.4%. According to Eurostat data from November 2023, youth unemployment in the EU stands at 14.5%. A decade ago, this rate was roughly 24%. How did youth unemployment decrease by approximately 10% over the past 10 years in the EU despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and other crises affecting the European labour market?

Throughout 2013, the Youth Guarantee programme was initiated by the European Commission and was adopted by the European Council in the same year. The Youth Guarantee is the political commitment of all EU member states to provide all young people aged 15 to 29 with an offer of employment, an apprenticeship, internship, volunteering, or further education within four months of completing formal education or losing employment. The Youth Guarantee is a commitment of all relevant sectors in the country, including the executive authorities, employment agencies, civil society organisations, and the business sector, i.e. employers. The main goal of the programme is the inclusion of NEET youth, that is, those not in employment, education, or training.

With the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans published by the European Commission in October 2020, the Youth Guarantee programme became an obligation for Western Balkan economies aspiring to EU membership. They committed to implementing this programme, as stated in the Western Balkans Declaration on the Sustainable Integration of Youth into the Labour Market, adopted at the Second Ministerial Meeting of the European Union – Western Balkans held on 8 July 2021, in Slovenia. Western Balkan economies are at different stages of implementing the Youth Guarantee programme. North Macedonia, which initiated the programme in 2018, is the most successful regional example. Implementation plans for the Youth Guarantee have been adopted in Serbia, Kosovo*, and Albania, while Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are still awaiting adoption.

As mentioned earlier, North Macedonia is the most successful country in the region in implementing the Youth Guarantee. From 2017 to 2019, youth unemployment decreased by nearly 9%. The new Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee for the period 2023-2026 was adopted by the Government of North Macedonia in March 2023. North Macedonia has set a target of 30%, meaning it considers the Youth Guarantee successful if a minimum of 30% of young people who go through the programme find employment, apprenticeships, volunteering, or further education and training within a four-month period. Out of 19,322 young people who participated in the Youth Guarantee programme in 2021, 41% were granted opportunities for employment, volunteering, or further education. In 2022, over 20,000 youths participated in the programme, and 43% were successful in securing employment or opportunities for training once they had completed the programme. Therefore, North Macedonia is considered exceptionally successful in implementing this programme, having achieved and exceeded the set goal of 30%.

Despite the successful integration of a large number of programme participants into the labour market, the implementation of the Youth Guarantee also contributes to strengthening institutions. The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is the main driver of the implementation process, and a Coordination Council for the Youth Guarantee has been established to oversee the programme’s implementation. However, the youth unemployment rate in North Macedonia in 2022 stood at 34.9%, which is still nearly double the EU average, standing at 14.5%, and remains the highest youth unemployment rate in the entire region. The European Commission Progress Report on North Macedonia for 2023, states that active labour market measures and the Youth Guarantee programme are currently inadequately monitored, evaluated, and assessed. A key challenge of programme implementation is the limited financial resources the Government of North Macedonia is unable to secure.

The Youth Guarantee in Serbia has been recognised in the new National Employment Strategy for the period 2021-2026 and the Youth Strategy adopted in January 2023. The youth unemployment rate in Serbia for the year 2022 stood at 24.9%, while the unemployment rate for so-called NEET youth – those not employed, not in the educational system, nor in training – stood at roughly 15%. In late December 2023, the Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee. The pilot programme will be conducted in three branches of the National Employment Service – in Kruševac, Sremska Mitrovica, and Niš – from January 2024 to the end of 2026. The aim is to expand the programme across the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia. During the EU Opportunities Week in 2023, the Republic of Serbia and the European Union signed a financial assistance agreement amounting to EUR 5.5 million, directed towards the implementation of the Youth Guarantee. This funding is specifically for piloting the programme in the mentioned three branches. Institutions in Serbia emphasise that there are currently insufficient capacities for the implementation of this programme throughout the entire country, but full implementation of the programme at the national level is one of the main priorities of the Operational Programme within IPA III 2023-2027. The programme is led by the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veterans, and Social Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, which has established a Coordination Body to develop and monitor the implementation plan for the Youth Guarantee. They have also formed an Expert Group to carry out preparatory activities.

Kosovo* is still in the early preparatory phase regarding negotiating Chapter 19, which pertains to social policy and employment. However, the European Commission Progress Report on Kosovo* for 2023 notes that some progress has been made in preparing for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee, following the Implementation Plan adopted in November 2022. The report emphasises the need to continue with the Implementation Plan and creating conditions for piloting the programme in two municipalities – Mitrovica and Uroševac. The youth unemployment rate in Kosovo* saw a remarkable decrease of 16.6% in 2022. In 2021, the rate was 38%, dropping to 21.4% in 2022. The Employment Agency of Kosovo* is undergoing restructuring to enable the implementation of the programme. However, the European Commission’s report highlights the significant challenge of a lack of human resources in public employment services and an outdated information system.

According to the European Commission Progress Report on Albania for 2023, preparations for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee programme have progressed. It is deemed necessary to commence piloting the programme to enable its implementation across the entire country. Albania has adopted the Implementation Plan for the Youth Guarantee as an annex to the new National Youth Strategy for the period 2023-2030. The overall process is led by the Ministry of Finance and Economy of the Republic of Albania. The youth unemployment rate for 2022 stood at 27.8%, while the unemployment rate for so-called NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) youth stood at 23.4%.

Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are the only countries in the region that have not yet adopted the Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan. The youth unemployment rate in Montenegro stood at 28.3% in May 2023. According to the Progress Report for Montenegro in 2023, the European Commission recommends strengthening the Employment Agency and preparing for the implementation of the Youth Guarantee. A Working Group for the Youth Guarantee programme has been formed to enhance the draft Implementation Plan, collaborating with experts from the International Labour Organisation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is ranked last in the region relative to implementation of the Youth Guarantee programme. The Progress Report of the European Commission on Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2023, highlights that limited progress has been made regarding the finalisation and adoption of the Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan. In October 2023, the Employment Strategy in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2023-2030 was finally adopted, recognising the Youth Guarantee as a completely new youth employment model. The lengthy process of its adoption represented a major obstacle to the Youth Guarantee programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The programme’s pilot phase has already begun, with two smaller municipalities, Visoko and Čitluk, chosen for the pilot. After the pilot phase, expansion across the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected. At the national level, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for the implementation process, while the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is in charge of implementing the programme in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Information about the Youth Guarantee in the Republika Srpska entity is not available on the internet, nor is it mentioned in the annual reports of the European Commission. The youth unemployment rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the highest in the entire region, reaching 33.47% for the year 2022.

The key to the successful implementation of the Youth Guarantee programme lies in the intensive collaboration of all sectors in the country—from the governments responsible for providing financial resources for implementation to employers and civil society organisations. Once the Employment Strategy is adopted in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is expected that Bosnia and Herzegovina will adopt the Implementation Plan in the coming period. We hope that this will be followed by Montenegro, allowing all economies in the region to implement this ambitious programme for young people across their territories in the coming years. However, strong political will from all governments in the region will be essential for this, as only they can secure financial support for successful implementation.

Author: Nemanja Ivanović, Youth Activist and Member of the Governing Board of the Social Democratic Party

* This publication was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Democracy Foundation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

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December 14 2023

Regional Debate: Participation of Youth in Political Processes in Western Balkans

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Within the RYDE project funded by the European Union, ADD organized the first in a series of regional debates in Belgrade, held at the Miljenko Dereta space, Dobracina Street 55. The event took place on Thursday, December 14th, strategically scheduled before the onset of pre-election silence in Serbia, preceding the elections on December 17th. This timing was deliberately chosen to address the debate topic: “Youth Participation in Political Processes in the Western Balkans.” Participants included Natalija Stojmenović, a parliamentary candidate from the Serbia Against Violence list; Sofija Kirsanov, a youth activist and co-founder of the NGO “Network for Youth Activism” in Montenegro; Sofija Todorović, director of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Belgrade; and Damir Zejnulahović from the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade, with journalist Mia Bjelogrlić moderating.

Attendees concurred that youth participation in political processes in the Western Balkans is significantly below desired levels, with substantial room for improvement in both developing existing mechanisms and creating new ones to ensure their engagement. Often, while formalities are observed, young people remain distanced from decision-making positions. This situation discourages and demotivates them from participating in their countries’ political processes, with their involvement typically limited to election participation, which is also lower than other age groups across the region. Young people who actively engage in politics and join political parties often do so for material rather than ideological reasons, typically choosing the ruling party in hopes of securing employment or other material benefits rather than out of conviction or a genuine desire to contribute to societal change. There is particular concern about the percentage of young people holding radical, far-right views and research indicating that young people have more conservative attitudes on certain social issues than older generations. Young individuals entering political processes, whether through NGO youth activism or political parties, often face discrimination, belittlement, and challenges in advancing within party hierarchies or asserting their views. This is especially true for young women and those from marginalized groups. As a result, a significant number of young people seek their future outside the region, either actively preparing for or expressing a desire to leave their country.

At the debate, there were 29 young attendees, of whom 14 were women. (ATTACHMENT: attendance list) Additionally, through the Zoom platform, another 37 young individuals from various youth organizations and organizations dealing with youth issues followed the debate. Out of those present at the debate, 20 are active in civil sector organizations or actively collaborate with them.

July 11 2023

Just Transition: A New Social Contract for the Wellbeing of People and the Planet

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Call to Action

Chair of the Executive Committee of the Regional Academy for Democratic Development Balsa Bozovic will participate at a closed-door event in Valladolid, Spain, on 11 July 2023 to gather Progressive stakeholders from across Spain and other EU Member States for a timely exchange of views on acting together for a Just Transition. The event is organised in connection with the significant and demanded focus on Just Transition by the Spanish and Belgian Presidencies of the Council of the EU, by SOLIDAR, the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL).

This high-level event will bring together over 50 progressive stakeholders (Ministers, scholars, experts and civil society organisations concerned with social and environmental sustainability) from Spain and Europe. During the first part of the event, civil society representatives will participate in roundtable discussions and will develop recommendations on advancing a Just Transition in Spain and all of Europe that will be presented at the end of the meeting.

Taking advantage of the Informal Meeting of European Environment & Energy Ministers that will take place in Valladolid on the same day, European progressive Ministers such as Teresa Ribera (Spain), Zakia Khattabi (Belgium), and Leonore Gewessler (Austria) will participate in our event and showcase the perspectives of their countries.

A call to action from European civil society organisations will be presented to the Ministers and will give impulse for further action for a Just Transition in the framework of the Spanish and Belgian Presidencies of the Council of the EU in 2023 and 2024. In addition, it will be published on Euractiv on the 11^th of July and sent to more Ministers, EU leaders and other decision-makers.

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November 15 2022

Serrbia 2030: Parliamentary representation of Albanian national minority must not be denied

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Round table in Presevo turned out to be dedicated to the most relevant topic in the local community at the moment, since they were held in the eve of the repeated elections for National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. Election results were contested four times in the attempts to prevent Albanian national minority from parliamentary representation and this is why the panel there was of extreme importance for the local community. Topics discussed were, among others, inter-ethnic relations, efforts to make Serbia a truly civil society, coexistence and tolerance, human rights, rights of national minorities, equality, reconciliation, overcoming differences and various local initiatives that aim to achieve those goals, as well as their results and scope. The participants of the round table were activists, journalists, members of parliament, representatives of local youth civil society organizations who have been working for years to build better inter-ethnic relations in this part of Serbia.

The Chair of the Executive Committee of the Regional Academy for Democratic Development, Balša Božović, strongly condemned the attempts to illegally annul and change the results of the last parliamentary elections and to deny the Albanian national community the right to parliamentary representation. He warned that no one has the right to deny the right of citizens of Serbia who belong to Albanian national minority to have their own representatives in the Parliament of Serbia, and that attempts to change and negate their electoral will send them the message that they are not an equal part of our society. He called on all pro-European parties in Serbia to stand up for the protection and defense of the election result, thanks to which the list of the Party for Democratic Action won one mandate in the elections, and to strongly oppose attempts to strip Albanian minority from that seat by force and contrary to the law. Božović assessed that without that, without the complete integration of all national communities in Serbian society, there is no possibility for Serbia to become a democratic country and that this is an issue that goes beyond the electoral success of any party. He concluded that respecting the electoral will of the Albanian national community is a way to build trust, and that it is key to establishing good inter-ethnic relations. Long-term Member of Parliament and President of the Party for Democratic Action, Šaip Kamberi, said that the year 2022 is crucial for the image of Serbia in 2030, and that this image netirely depends on how Serbia will determine itself according to some of the most significant issues and challenges it faces. He said that among them are the question of the solution of the status of Kosovo, which is crucial not only for the situation in Serbia in the coming years, but also for the stability of the entire Western Balkans. He warned that the citizens of the Preševo Valley are hostages of what is happening in the relations between Serbia and Kosovo and that in order to reach a permanent and sustainable solution, the cooperation of all the countries of the Western Balkans is necessary. In this regard, Kamberi stressed the importance of the Open Balkans initiative and emphasized that some of the ideas coming from the central government, such as the one about the “Serbian world”, are directly opposed to everything that cooperation in the Balkans entails and that they go hand in hand with the glorification of war crimes and war criminals and politics from the 1990s. Commenting on numerous obstructions and sabotages in connection with the last national elections for deputies and attempts to challenge the election results of the Albanian community and prevent parliamentary representation, Kamberi assessed that the Albanian community in Serbia is at a crossroads and that even those political forces that have always, since the 1990s, advocated for participation in the elections, are brought into a situation where they have to reconsider the expediency of their views on participation in the elections and political processes in Serbia and make a new decision about whether it is worth participating in the elections or resorting to other methods with the full risk that they may have destabilizing effects.