Within the RYDE project funded by the European Union, ADD organized the first in a series of regional debates in Belgrade, held at the Miljenko Dereta space, Dobracina Street 55. The event took place on Thursday, December 14th, strategically scheduled before the onset of pre-election silence in Serbia, preceding the elections on December 17th. This timing was deliberately chosen to address the debate topic: “Youth Participation in Political Processes in the Western Balkans.” Participants included Natalija Stojmenović, a parliamentary candidate from the Serbia Against Violence list; Sofija Kirsanov, a youth activist and co-founder of the NGO “Network for Youth Activism” in Montenegro; Sofija Todorović, director of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Belgrade; and Damir Zejnulahović from the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade, with journalist Mia Bjelogrlić moderating.
Attendees concurred that youth participation in political processes in the Western Balkans is significantly below desired levels, with substantial room for improvement in both developing existing mechanisms and creating new ones to ensure their engagement. Often, while formalities are observed, young people remain distanced from decision-making positions. This situation discourages and demotivates them from participating in their countries’ political processes, with their involvement typically limited to election participation, which is also lower than other age groups across the region. Young people who actively engage in politics and join political parties often do so for material rather than ideological reasons, typically choosing the ruling party in hopes of securing employment or other material benefits rather than out of conviction or a genuine desire to contribute to societal change. There is particular concern about the percentage of young people holding radical, far-right views and research indicating that young people have more conservative attitudes on certain social issues than older generations. Young individuals entering political processes, whether through NGO youth activism or political parties, often face discrimination, belittlement, and challenges in advancing within party hierarchies or asserting their views. This is especially true for young women and those from marginalized groups. As a result, a significant number of young people seek their future outside the region, either actively preparing for or expressing a desire to leave their country.
At the debate, there were 29 young attendees, of whom 14 were women. (ATTACHMENT: attendance list) Additionally, through the Zoom platform, another 37 young individuals from various youth organizations and organizations dealing with youth issues followed the debate. Out of those present at the debate, 20 are active in civil sector organizations or actively collaborate with them.
Sexual violence, as one of the most brutal forms of violence against women, remains unpunished in significant numbers of cases due to an inadequate and scientifically incorrect legal definition of this criminal offence. Definition of rape in all countries of the Western Balkans remains based on necessary use of force and requires victim’s physical resistance; decisions on whether the rape took place are based on traditional beliefs about “typical” behaviour in any such situation, gender stereotypes and myths about male and female sexuality. This is in collision with Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, better known as the Istanbul Convention; this explicitly calls the states to amend the definition of rape and to consider every sexual act without consent as rape.
The aim of the Phase I of the project was to undertake contextualised and comprehensive research on the level of knowledge, policies, attitudes and opinions of political parties in all Western Balkans countries regarding amendment of legislative definition of rape and improvement of the position of survivors, and to develop a strategy for each of the Western Balkan countries to amend legislation, practices, and bylaws regarding rape and sexual violence against women and girls based on robust analysis of opinion (attitudes) and policies of major political parties.
Phase I showed that the problem of legal definition of rape is little known about around the region, both in general and political public. Even the persons dealing with human and women rights within the parties, are often unaware that there is a problem in the legal definition of the rape and that it needs to be amended. This is why political parties, in a vast majority of cases, have no policy regarding the issue, have not dealt with it, and had no statements, campaigns or activities to change the legislation. It also revealed that the parties, as a rule, are open to addressing this problem. However, they do not put this issue in the focus of their own actions due to the assessment that other topics are more important or can bring more significant political benefit.
Phase I of the project has intricately delineated a comprehensive array of subjects, concerns, and domains that are slated for inclusion in the training curriculum. This phase is dedicated to the enlightenment of 50 national trainers and party messengers, individuals poised to become pivotal catalysts for the transformation of legislative paradigms. Their role extends beyond the confines of political parties to spearhead advocacy initiatives both internally and externally. Their strategic significance is underscored by their indispensable contribution to the impending Phase III, wherein advocacy campaigns will be initiated and substantive amendments to legislation will be proffered.
The project is being implemented by Regional Academy for Democratic Development with the support of UK Labour.
“The relationships between Montenegro are sensitive and complex, and they should be approached realistically with full awareness of what they draw from history, as well as what shapes them through current decision-makers, as well as through the prism of evident attempts to provoke a crisis by the authorities in Belgrade. These were some of the highlights from yesterday’s Plenum on Montenegrin-Serbian relations, organized by the Center for Civic Education (CGO) and the Regional Academy for Democratic Development (ADD) with the support of the Swiss Embassy. The Plenum was opened by Daliborka Uljarević, the executive director of CGO, and Balša Božović, the director of ADD, by presenting the key findings of the public opinion research on the relations between Montenegro and Serbia through a comparative analysis. It is worth noting that earlier, individual research findings were presented separately in Montenegro and Serbia.
“Differences in the positions and interests of political actors, as well as among a significant portion of the citizens in Serbia and Montenegro, are serious and enduring, but they should neither be underestimated nor overestimated. Much depends on how things will continue to develop and what political course Serbia will take in respecting the international agreements it has signed. In this traumatically charged foreign policy context, with various selected foreign policy destinations, these differences could potentially become conflictual,” stated Dr. Zoran Stojiljković, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade, in his commentary. He emphasized the significant importance of the research for the academic community and decision-makers.
Historian and president of the HIPMONT association, Miloš Vukanović, highlighted the number of undecided respondents on questions related to defining a value framework, such as attitudes towards the partisan and Chetnik movements, and the importance of the education system along with its deficiencies. Vukanović explained that the long-standing narrative of the endangerment of Serbs in Montenegro is inaccurate. He said, “A certain number of people were indeed endangered and discriminated against by the DPS regime, but this was due to their political, not national, affiliation.” He concluded by noting the significance of data that shows a considerable percentage of those who support the aggressor, as this represents a problem, in reference to the respondents’ attitudes toward the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Aleksandar Sekulović, vice president of Antifascist Serbia, had three key impressions. He said, “The first impression is that it is very well done, current, and can be extremely beneficial to decision-makers in both countries. The second impression shows that Serbia and Montenegro are largely two different societies, both culturally and in terms of values. The third impression is that respondents in Serbia, in some cases, displayed a significant or noticeable level of insincerity, especially regarding the state-legal status, or independence of Montenegro, as well as the external influence of Serbia on events in Montenegro, where it seems they provided expected answers,” among other observations.
Slobodan Georgiev, the news director of TV NOVA S, believes that although the issue of Montenegro’s independence was resolved in Montenegro in 2006, it still lingers in Serbia. He mentioned that the radical interpretation of history in Belgrade fantasizes about the moment when Montenegro separated from the union with Serbia, as it opens the door to a potential separation of Kosovo. Georgiev also mentioned attempts to provoke a crisis that would allow control of Montenegro from Belgrade. He noted the influence of the academic community and the long-established imperial policy, where the narrative of “all Serbs in one state” has been nurtured, which affects young people and their value systems.
Dragan Đukanović, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade, believes that the results in both countries are worse than what the research indicates. He mentioned a high degree of agreement in Serbia regarding reporting on Montenegro, whether it is media controlled by the government or those that can be considered part of an independent media scene. He pointed out that the new power structure in Montenegro draws its legitimacy from the religious movement, making the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church significant.
Mihailo Miletić, president of the Association of Montenegrin Electors in Serbia, thinks that there is institutional endangerment of Montenegrins in Serbia. He explained this through the obstacles the Montenegrin national community in Serbia faces in the process of choosing their representatives and the discrimination against Montenegrins in the Serbian education system that denies Montenegrin history and identity. He also warned of the continuous decrease in the number of Montenegrins in Serbia.
“It is difficult to find recognition of the Montenegrin identity among the elites in Serbia,” according to historian Milivoj Bešlin. Interpreting the research results, he explained that, despite the authoritarian regime, there is a diversity of opinions, which is a positive sign and reflects a changing relationship with reality through new media and social networks. “Elites create an expansionist narrative when it comes to Serbia. Another aspect concerns the narrative of protecting Serbs outside of Serbia, which is the shortest definition of Serbian nationalism today – Serbs outside of Serbia,” he emphasized. Bešlin explained that it is of utmost importance to the authorities in Serbia to have Serbian lists in countries in the region with Serbian populations. He also pointed out that the Serbian authorities consider as Serbs in Montenegro only those who are voters of party structures under the influence of Vučić. Given the data on the number of those who identify as Serbs in Montenegro, this means that most of them actually do not trust Aleksandar Vučić.”
Srđan Šušnica, a culturologist and political analyst, pointed out the issue of ethno-territorialization in the relations between Serbia and Montenegro. He highlighted the significant discrepancy between respondents in Serbia and Montenegro on questions such as language, acceptance of Montenegro’s independence, and the role of Serbia in protecting Serbs in Montenegro. He expressed concern about this trend and how it normalizes various types of interventions by Serbia in Montenegro.
Adnan Prekić, a professor at the University of Montenegro, explained that the situation between Serbia and Montenegro is not a result of recent political activities but rather a continuation of historical policies. He mentioned the main problem in communication between the two sides being the Serbian government’s attempt to turn the Serbs in Montenegro into a diaspora.
This event is part of the “Plenum on Montenegrin-Serbian Relations!” project, conducted by CGO in Montenegro in collaboration with ADD in Serbia, with financial support from the Swiss Embassy. The Plenum brought together around 50 historians, representatives of the academic community, members of non-governmental organizations, journalists, and analysts. They had the opportunity to provide their perspectives through dialogue on the research findings and contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of relations between Serbia and Montenegro. The ultimate goal is to create a new narrative that promotes respect for good neighborly relations, religious rights, multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, European values, and human rights.
“Sustainable alternative for European integration of the Western Balkans does not exist, and anything else would be merely a foreign policy adventure that would be disastrous for stability, sustainable development, and even peace in the Western Balkans,” said the President of the Executive Board of the Academy for Development of Democracy (ADD) at the conference “Time to move on – 20 years since the Thessaloniki Summit,” organized by the Regional Academy for Democracy Development (ADD), the Center for Civic Education (CGO) from Podgorica, and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES).
Balša Božović also mentioned that 20 years after the Thessaloniki Summit, most of the Western Balkans still wants to believe that its future lies in the EU. “New war circumstances in Europe, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, have made it necessary for the EU and the Western Balkans to renew their mutual commitment and continue working together, in new circumstances, on the integration of this part of Europe into the Union,” Božović stated.
Božović stated that the experience of Ukraine teaches us that peace is no longer guaranteed. “The Western Balkans, as Europe’s soft underbelly, represents a weak point in European unity in foreign and security policy”
Božović emphasized.
He added that it is important for the problem of stalled reform processes and difficult relationships to be resolved by the EU based on the Copenhagen criteria and the European system of values. Božović mentioned that the experience of recent years has shown that some partners lack sufficient sensitivity to the situation in the Western Balkans. He believes that today, European sensitivity is more necessary than ever. “Peace is no longer a given; peace is a privilege, and in the Western Balkans, it stands on shaky ground,” Božović said. He is of the opinion that, after the terrorism in Kosovo, “we have an obligation to focus on the democratization and Europeanization of the region. We cannot pretend that nothing happened in northern Kosovo because if we do, it will happen again,” Božović said, emphasizing that European institutions must find a way to deal with influences that can jeopardize peace in the Western Balkans. Božović believes that those who have made the most progress in negotiations, like Montenegro, need to be supported. “Helping Montenegro to politically consolidate after a three-year crisis and gather the strength to continue on the EU path would be a sign that the Union is not geostrategically yielding this part of Europe to malign influences from the east and does not tolerate malignant influences from neighboring countries,” Božović said. He stated that if a country does not want an EU future, it should say so clearly, but this decision should not hinder others and drag them back into an uncertain past. “It’s time to move forward because tomorrow may already be too late,” Božović concluded. Director of the Center for Civic Education (CGO), Daliborka Uljarević, expressed her opinion that Montenegro has gone from being an outstanding student to a repeater with no signs of making the necessary substantial progress in the near future. She is unsure about the prospects of Montenegro’s EU integration, especially in light of the recent developments in the structure of the government. According to her, Montenegro has been stagnant for six years without closing a single chapter. While the majority of the population supports the European dream and Montenegro’s path towards EU membership, the country is losing influence from the EU, its member states, the USA, and other Western partners. Uljarević believes that the enthusiasm and optimism among the negotiation structures in the region, which are the backbone of the process, are at a minimum.
Daliborka Uljarević expressed her concerns about Montenegro’s progress in EU integration and the lack of commitment to the process in the past few years. She mentioned that Montenegro is witnessing the departure of its second government in the last three years that, unlike the governments of the previous regime, has not demonstrated dedication to the European integration process. Uljarević explained that it will quickly become apparent in which direction the new government is heading, but the current indications are not encouraging for what should be a qualitatively different approach. She highlighted that amidst regional instability and political upheavals where agreements are not based on values but on a struggle for survival, the topic of European integration remains on the sidelines. Despite the 20 years that have passed since the Thessaloniki Summit, Montenegro still finds itself in the same waiting room, as there has not been a convincing political will for reforms. This lack of political will, combined with chronic understaffing, a lack of knowledge, and inertia, as well as an excess of empty but dangerous ambitions, has impeded progress. Uljarević pointed out that the current geopolitical circumstances offer a favorable wind for the region, as there is greater attention from the European Union, its institutions, and officials regarding the enlargement process. She emphasized that this opportunity must not be missed, and the EU integration process should not become a series of unmet expectations. She also stressed the need for the EU to react more promptly and proactively by providing support in achieving the standards the region aspires to and eliminating factors that push society away from progressive values. Uljarević believes that political responsibility is at the core of the process. She explained that this responsibility should bring with it the willingness to replace populism with hard work and credible results. Once this is achieved, it will be possible to talk about a clearer EU perspective for the countries seeking EU membership and reducing existing frustrations due to the lack of progress. Regarding Montenegro’s commitment to EU integration, Uljarević mentioned that the symbolic fact that the country has been without a chief negotiator with the EU for nearly a year speaks volumes about where EU integration currently stands on Montenegro’s agenda. Rene Schle, the Director of the Regional Office for Southeast Europe of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), reflected on the 20th anniversary of the Thessaloniki Summit and its impact on the European integration process in the region. He acknowledged that the ambitions and ideas presented at Thessaloniki were different from the current reality. However, he emphasized that it would be inaccurate to claim that no progress has been made during this time. According to Schle, some progress has been achieved, as negotiations are underway with certain countries, while processes with others, like Albania and North Macedonia, are just starting. He noted that it is challenging to label this progress as a significant breakthrough because the term “enlargement” naturally leads to high expectations. Looking back over the past 20 years, it’s difficult to say that many of these expectations have been fully realized. On the other hand, Schle acknowledged that there is a lot happening, with new ideas and initiatives emerging. There are sometimes conflicting ideas on how to continue the enlargement process. The Friedrich-Ebert Foundation aims to bring together representatives of governments, civil society, and the academic community to engage in discussions about these ideas. The synergy among these various stakeholders is considered essential for addressing the challenges and complexities of the enlargement process.
Filip Ivanović, the candidate for the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, discussed the country’s progress on its European integration journey during a panel on the 20th anniversary of the Thessaloniki Summit. He highlighted that Montenegro has not officially heard the term “regression” from Brussels, meaning that no European Commission (EC) report has used that term when assessing Montenegro’s progress. While the term “regression” may not have been mentioned, he expressed concern about the changing dynamics and the fact that Montenegro has been progressing more slowly in terms of harmonizing and incorporating EU legal standards, and in some respects, has even stagnated. Ivanović stressed that it is essential to make progress in Chapters 23 and 24 to advance further in the EU integration process. He noted that the new government, set to be formed in the coming week, aims to have a clear and precise agenda that includes accelerating European integration. He also mentioned that appointments in the judiciary are the responsibility of the Parliament, and he expects political actors in Parliament to demonstrate their commitment to full EU membership in practice, not just in their programs. This, he believes, will be a test not only for the new parliamentary majority but for the entire Parliament. Ivanović also pointed out the need to strengthen Montenegro’s negotiation structure to be more robust and agile. He mentioned the importance of appointing a chief negotiator, strengthening the Montenegro Mission to the EU, and addressing critical points in the administration, primarily concerning the successful preparation of infrastructure projects. Regarding the government’s relationship with Serbia, Ivanović stated that the cooperation with Serbia is based on mutual respect and is part of the program for this and previous governments. He also noted that some parties in the parliamentary majority have had good relations with Moscow in the past, but this hasn’t prevented them from having a pro-Western orientation. Finally, Ivanović emphasized that the new government will strongly orient itself towards the European Union, and he believes that Montenegro can be prepared for EU membership even before the target year of 2030. Aleksandar Spasov, Advisor to the President of North Macedonia on Foreign Policy and Constitutional Issues, acknowledged that since the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia have become EU members. However, the path to EU membership for other countries in the region remains uncertain, and the proposed target date of 2030 is more of a political declaration rather than a set date, as it depends on various factors. The enlargement process is influenced by a range of considerations and complexities, making it challenging to predict an exact date for accession.
Aleksandar Spasov emphasized that the European Union is in a different geopolitical position today. He expressed the importance for the EU to ensure that this potential is not missed and that it doesn’t become an isolated island separated from its European neighbors. In the context of the Western Balkans, maintaining a path toward EU integration is crucial for stability and cooperation in the region. Borko Stefanović, the Vice President of the Serbian Parliament, stressed that there is a consensus that it’s time to move forward towards the EU, but the challenge lies in determining how and in which direction to proceed. He mentioned that there is a formal invitation from Brussels for all countries in the region, and there is a formal and open desire from the nations to join the EU. However, he highlighted that there is a loss of energy and time while trying to understand the current situation. Stefanović pointed out that 44% of Serbia’s citizens support EU accession, even amid the challenging circumstances in the country. He expressed his surprise at this level of support, given the open autocracy, the facade of democracy, a lack of media freedom, corruption, and links to organized crime. He stressed the importance of a merit-based approach, indicating that both Serbia and the EU need to do their homework to ensure progress and accession. In essence, this requires substantial reforms in both Serbia and the EU’s approach to enlargement.
Borko Stefanović highlighted the importance of regional cooperation and reconciliation in the Western Balkans. He suggested the need to establish joint secretariats or similar structures to address mutual concerns and foster unity among the countries in the region. He emphasized that a collective voice and solidarity are essential, as standing together is crucial for achieving shared goals. He also emphasized the importance of not being divided by political differences, as this would only lead to mutual condemnation of each other’s governments and actions.
Elvira Habota, the Director of the Directorate for European Integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, acknowledged the progress that Bosnia and Herzegovina has made in implementing important laws in priority areas, even before gaining candidate status for EU membership. She stressed the significance of political will in driving progress, as well as the need for a constructive approach to address technical and expert issues that sometimes become subjects of political contention.
Fitor Murati, Acting Director of the Directorate for Europe and the EU in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora of Kosovo, emphasized that Kosovo is committed to its path toward EU integration, as there is no “Plan B” or “Plan C” for Kosovo. He reiterated Kosovo’s strong desire to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community. He also addressed the geopolitical context and the role of geopolitics in the integration process, pointing out the challenges posed by the aggression of Serbia and Russia’s support for paramilitary actions.
Gazmend Turdiu, the General Secretary of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania, underscored the importance of taking European Commission reports seriously, as they serve as indicators of real progress. He discussed the historical significance of the Solun Summit and the journey of the Western Balkans back to where they belong – Europe. He warned against the region being left in a vacuum, as other actors like Russia, China, and the Middle East are ready to fill any void left by the EU’s distance. Turdiu emphasized that a delayed EU engagement in the region would worsen the situation.
Josip Juratović, a member of the German Bundestag, mentioned the geopolitical and security significance of EU enlargement in the context of a relatively unstable political landscape within the EU. He noted the rise of right-wing structures and the growing importance of democratic values. Juratović emphasized that simply focusing on economics and economic questions will not resolve the challenges before Europe. He called for more solidarity and a shared political platform within the Western Balkans to make progress toward EU membership.
A stable, European, and civic government in Montenegro can fulfill all the reforms from the European Union (EU) accession process within four years, but it is questionable whether Montenegro will get such a government,” said former Minister of European Affairs and a member of BIEPAG, Jovana Marović, during the panel “Effects and Results of the New Negotiation Framework and New Models of European Integration” at the conference of the Regional Academy for Democracy Development (ADD), the Center for Civic Education (CGO), and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) “Time to Move Forward – 20 Years since the Thessaloniki Summit.”
She pointed out that there are three sets of circumstances due to which Montenegro is not part of the EU after 11 years of negotiations.
“First, from the beginning of the negotiations, I have not seen a genuine willingness to bridge the gap between the technical and political aspects of the negotiation process. We have success in the technical part, but not in the political part. We are still debating whether political parties have the will and desire to join the EU,” Marović believes. On the other hand, she stated that the EU advocates the principle of progress based on merits but does not apply it in practice. As she added, the third set of circumstances relates to the fact that neither the EU nor political elites have a clear vision of ‘where to go with the Western Balkan countries.’
“My recent experience in the government of Montenegro shows that political parties prioritize their interests. European integration is just a mantra to gain the votes of the citizens,” Marović explained.
She said that even though the vast majority of citizens support EU membership, political parties cannot reach a consensus on the most important issues that should accelerate the European integration process. “I primarily mean the transitional criteria from chapters 23 and 24 that we received ten years ago. During the past year, each of the political parties has blocked at least once one of the appointments of holders of judicial functions. Without that political aspect, we cannot accelerate European integration,” Marović emphasized.
She stated that the greatest responsibility lies with the government, but political parties also bear responsibility for Montenegro’s failure to enter the final phase of the negotiation process.
Marović pointed out that Montenegro has a 100% alignment with the common foreign and security policy of the EU, but it is not clear what it has gained from it. “How does the EU value it if one country incurs certain damages due to that alignment, while another only receives a lower rating in the annual report?” Marović asked.
She believes that the new methodology has not fundamentally changed anything in Montenegro’s accession process. “Without more active involvement on the ground of EU member states, without sanctions and incentives, without cluster reporting, I don’t see that it has fundamentally changed anything in this whole story,” Marović stated.
“The most significant problem remains – too many integration frameworks and too little integration. A year ago, we signed three agreements (within the Berlin Process) that did not bring us anything fundamentally new. If the common regional market is the primary framework for integration, then the question arises whether Montenegro must perpetually wait for those less prepared states,” Marović said.
According to her, the whole situation in Montenegro is, in her words, a defeat for the European Union. “You cannot blame only the Western Balkan countries for the lack of democracy,” Marović said.
She stated that it is impossible to determine whether any state will be ready to join the EU by 2030, but it is possible to create roadmaps for each state individually. “A stable, European, and civic government in Montenegro can fulfill all the reforms within four years. That is the essence. Whether we will get such a government, I really do not know and I am not sure,” Marović concluded.
The President of the Board of the Center for European Policy (CEP) from Serbia, Srđan Majstorović, stated that without political will, there is no possibility for progress in European integration.
“In the past 20 years, there has been a kind of cohabitation, a lack of political will on both sides – both the EU and the Western Balkans. Credibility has disappeared. No one here has shown the capacity to believe that progress will come,” Majstorović said.
He stated that 20 years since the Thessaloniki Summit represent a great opportunity to “sit down again” and define the future of Europe after 2030, and such a kind of “renewed commitment” can be symbolic but also a sign of a return of credibility to the whole process.
According to him, the EU remains seriously committed to the strategic importance of the enlargement process. “We need a new contract, a New Deal, based on which we will take the next steps, but again, without clear political principledness, which I do not currently recognize, it will be difficult to make those steps,” Majstorović assessed.
Ledion Krisafi, a senior researcher at the Albanian Institute for International Studies, stated that over the past year and a half, Albania has made significant strides, which may not necessarily be directly related to the opening of EU accession negotiations. “What Albania is doing now is related to the reform of the justice system, which has been ongoing for several years and has completely changed the country’s image,” Krisafi said.
He said that in the past few months, there has been an increase in reports of corruption, organized crime, and a message has been sent that there are no untouchable ministers, politicians, or even prime ministers. “I see the process this way, not so directly related to the negotiation and accession process as it is to judicial reforms,” Krisafi added.
Regarding the revised methodology for EU accession, he said that the EU does not want the Western Balkans to be a problem on the ground. “Countries like Serbia, with authoritarian regimes, regardless of the methodology, can hardly expect to become part of the EU. So, a lot depends on us,” Krisafi said.
He said that the new methodology can be a path to the EU and a way for the Union to resolve its own dilemmas and problems. “If we look at the previous methodology, we have Montenegro, where the situation is better than in Serbia. The methodology does not have much to do with what the country is doing. If the EU wants the Western Balkans to become part of the EU in six or seven years, they will do it whether we are ready or not,” Krisafi said.
Demush Shasha, the Executive Director of the Institute for European Policy in Kosovo, mentioned that Kosovo’s path to accession has always been closely tied to the dialogue with Serbia, and the next step towards obtaining candidate status for Kosovo is strongly linked to progress in that dialogue.
He also commented on the EU enlargement methodology, stating that after four years, one can evaluate the results of enlargement policies. It has been announced that the new methodology will be more predictable, leading to a more credible and dynamic process.
Shasha noted that following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, there have been visible changes in the enlargement process. For instance, Ukraine will begin negotiations within 20 months from the time it submitted its application. This represents an unprecedented pace in the history of EU enlargement.
He argued that the EU has never acted as quickly and predictably in its enlargement process, attributing this to the actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, demonstrating that the enlargement process goes beyond documents and is significantly influenced by political factors.
Shasha emphasized that in the coming months, the EU will have a unique opportunity to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova and grant candidate status to Kosovo. He also highlighted the importance of making progress in negotiations with all countries in the region, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, and expressed hope that leaders will recognize the capital of EU enlargement and the peace, prosperity, and stability it can bring to the region.
Edo Kanlić, the Coordinator of the Initiative for Monitoring European Integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), emphasized that the start date of negotiations with the EU is important for BiH, but he personally finds it more critical that state institutions have the capacity to lead negotiations, even in the technical aspects. He pointed out that institutions in BiH lack knowledge and capacity in certain areas and expressed dissatisfaction with how EU institutions communicate with BiH’s institutions.
Kanlić commented on the country’s position, saying that the situation involving North Macedonia and Bulgaria could become a humorous example compared to Croatia’s attitude towards BiH during the accession process.
Albert Hani, the Secretary-General of the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), emphasized that the Western Balkan countries have the responsibility to produce more results in line with European values. He stated that by working together, the countries in the region can achieve progress, but there is a need to address the challenge of retaining employees and offer concrete solutions to the issues faced in the region.
Hani also talked about the Berlin Process, noting that RYCO focuses on trust-building projects.
Former Deputy Prime Minister of Bulgaria and Ambassador to Montenegro, Meglena Kuneva, stated that after the conflict in Ukraine and recent escalations in the Middle East, it is essential for the EU to redefine its geopolitical agenda. She argued that both the EU and the Western Balkans need each other for economic and political reasons to reduce the influence of third major powers, and that there is a threat of these influences growing if there is no clear vision for the region’s EU accession.
Kuneva emphasized that the methodology is not the key to enlargement; it’s a matter of political will and concrete results necessary for new milestones in terms of accession. She highlighted the importance of considering new ideas and proposals, such as French President Emmanuel Macron’s suggestion to establish a European Political Community, and called for a clear vision and clearer deadlines for the Western Balkans.
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) has become a reality, and the candidate countries need to strengthen institutions and the rule of law to protect themselves from external malign influences, said EU Ambassador in Montenegro, Oana Cristina Popa, at the panel “Western Balkans, International actors and the Geopolitics of the new era?” during the conference organised by the Centre for Civic Education (CCE), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Regional Academy for Democratic Development (ADD) titles “Time to Move On – 20 years of Thessaloniki Summit”.
She said that the enlargement package today includes not only the six countries of the Western Balkans, but also Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. “For the first time, an expansion package will be presented including all these countries. In the last three decades there have been many ups and downs. The current flywheel that made the war in Ukraine gives a new perspective for the region”, said Popa.
She mentioned that the enlargement package now encompasses not only the six Western Balkan countries but also Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. “For the first time, the enlargement packagewill be presented including all of these countries. In the last three decades, there have been many ups and downs. The current momentum created by the war in Ukraine provides a new perspective for the region,” Popa said.
She stressed that the priority of the EU remains enlargement. “There is still a tangible issue of foreign policy, it is no longer just a goal that is there without clear horizon. However, the challenges have also grown”, added Popa.
Popa noted that Serbia and Montenegro have progressed the most, opened the most chapters, while North Macedonia and Albania have just started negotiations, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) received candidate status, and that Kosovo has been offered visa liberalization. “These are ongoing processes, and we know that the rhythm is not to the liking of the candidate countries. And the Union would like to move it faster,” added Popa.
Popa said that the EU is often talked about as a supernatural body, and not a Union of 27 members. “It is often difficult to reach a consensus, the decision-making process is complicated. There are discussions on how to internally reform the EU. But it can be said that the enlargement has now become a reality,” said Popa.
According to her, another important issue is that there is conflict and conflicting influences in the region. “The malign influence of Russia is a reality, the war in Ukraine has caused even more problems, and the candidate countries should take this into account when implementing reforms – to protect themselves from malignant influences,” said Popa.
Speaking about the steps that the EU will implement, primarily about the economic-investment plan, she said that it must see that the candidate countries implement reforms. “It’s a partnership, a two-way street, you can’t have an advantage in relation to other candidates,” said Popa.
Popa emphasized that, along with the rule of law, candidate states must also have strong institutions to defend themselves against malign influences.“That’s why alignment with the Union’s foreign and security policy has become essential. Europe is now more concern with security than it has been in the past. Until now, it has been focused more on economic matters,” she explained.
The former director of the Brussels Office of the Stiftung Wissenschaft politik from Germany, Dušan Reljić, pointed out that the EU is significant for the entire region, due to the fact that in the past 20 years, the EU has not only expanded into the region but has also, in socio-economic terms, absorbed it into the EU.
He mentioned that the EU and NATO being present in the region has its own consequences.
“The region contributes significantly more to the EU than it receives from development aid. Over the past ten years, the trade deficit of the region with the EU has been 100 billion EUR. IPA III foresees nine billion in assistance for the region,” explained Reljić.
He said that the biggest problem is the emigration of people, with someone leaving the region approximately every 90 seconds. “Most of these people go to the EU, and the region sends its human capital and hard-earned money, and unlike EU members in the region, it does not receive solidarity aid from the Union,” Reljić pointed out.
According to him, “ordinary people have two choices – to emigrate or to accept reality, and the biggest reality in the region is dependence on authorities”.
The project manager at Sbunker from Kosovo, Visar Xhambazi, stated that the EU is a peace project and that it is now moving towards a war project.
He noted that the focus is no longer solely on the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, but on existential questions with implications for the region and the world. “The question is whether these countries are part of the EU’s future or whether they are a buffer zone between Russia and the EU,” added Xhambazi.
He raised the issue of the extent to which the shift towards security affects the enlargement, bearing in mind immigration, the need for raw materials, energy, and other matters for which the EU cannot rely on being self-sufficient. This, he added, pushed the Union to seek more sovereignty and autonomy.
Dina Bajramspahic, a political analyst, commented on the negotiations process, stating that lethargy has prevailed, and that enthusiasm and energy have been lost, which is necessary to renew.
“It is important to remember that we entered the EU integration process voluntarily. When faced with a recommendation or a task, our public officials become defenders of sovereignty, and among them are those who were not in favour of the independence of the state,” said Bajramspahić.
She mentioned the difference is in tools that various malign influences use. Bajramspahić stated that there is a significant number of citizens in Montenegro who do not believe in Russian influence, stating that among them is a part of pro-Montenegro-oriented citizens, and explaining that this issue and its associated dangers are underestimated, and not enough is done to deconstruct disinformation narratives. She also pointed out the concerning state of the media scene.
The conference was closed by Daliborka Uljarević, Executive Director of CCE, Balša Božović, Executive Director of ADD and Director of the FES Regional Office for Serbia and Montenegro, Kirsten Schönefeld.
Schönefeld reminded that the conference addressed a wide range of aspects of the European integration in the Western Balkans. “We discussed different integration models, phased accession, revised methodology, the Berlin process… All these aspects are very important. We should ask ourselves how to overcome the lethargy that has appeared over the years, and how to return to political missions and issues of EU enlargement”, stated Schoenefeld.
She concluded that European integration does not refer only to the integration of the Western Balkans, but also to the return of that region home and the fulfillment of the EU’s promise to make it a peace project.
The question of Montenegro’s independence is considered closed by the dominant majority of citizens of Serbia, but it is clear that the narratives heard from the authorities keep this topic within a framework that is not conducive for the development of healthy neighbourly relations. This is indicated by responses related to the insufficient degree of recognition of Montenegrin identity, the perception of the threat of Serbs in Montenegro, and Serbia’s obligation to protect them, as well as double standards in relation to religious processions as a model of political change. These are some of the key findings of thepublic opinion research on Serbia’s and Montenegro’s relations presented today in Belgrade at the Media Center. The research was conducted in Serbia by the Regional Academy for Democratic Development (ADD) in cooperation with the agency House of Win (HOW).
The research simultaneously conducted in Serbia and Montenegro is part of the project “Plenum on Montenegrin-Serbian Relations!” implemented by the Centre for Civic Education (CGO) from Montenegro with ADD from Serbia, and with financial support from the Embassy of Switzerland.
The research findings were presented by Balša Božović, Executive director of the ADD and Biljana Ilić, a representative of the HOW agency.
“The research findings indicate that independence for Montenegro is a closed matter for over 60% of citizens of Serbia, with one-fifth (20%) holding an opposing view, and one-fifth (19%) remaining undecided. Consequently, around one-fifth also believe that a referendum on Montenegro’s independence should be repeated or a referendum on Serbia and Montenegro’s unification held. However, it is important to emphasize that, for the majority, this is a closed issue – they have neither interest nor a differentiated opinion on it,” said Božović at the presentation.
“In line with this, approximately 60% believe that Montenegro should be independent, while less than one-fifth (18%) prefer the fiction of unification with of Serbia and Montenegro, or with Montenegro and Republika Srpska (12%),which are good indicators, given the potentially divisive conflict potential of these aspirations if they were to develop further,” Božović added.
When it comes to interstate relations, Božović stated that it is expected and positive that most citizens of Serbia think that Serbia has the closest relationships with Montenegro (27%) among the former Yugoslav states, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (22%), while to a lesser extent, with North Macedonia (14%), Croatia (9%), and Slovenia (8%). The percentage is negligible in the case of Kosovo (2%), and slightly less than one-fifth cannot assess the state of these relationships. From a deeper perspective, the majority view the relationship with Montenegro as neither good nor bad (37%), while less than a third consider it excellent or good (30%), and just over one-fourth (28%) view it as bad or very bad.
“Citizens of Serbia do not predominantly believe that Serbia influences the political situation in Montenegro (49%), and as much as 33% of respondents do not have a stance on this matter. Less than a fifth (18%) believe that Serbia interferes in Montenegro’s internal affairs, and even among those who recognize this influence, the prevailing view is that it is mostly insignificant rather than extensive,” Božović pointed out.
Regarding the identification of the main problems in Serbia’s and Montenegro’s relations, respondents could provide multiple answers, and the recognition of Kosovo (34%) stands out significantly as the top issue. Following that, to a much lesser extent, is the perception of the bad position of Serbs in Montenegro (13%), poor economic cooperation (9%), the issue of NATO membership (8%), and the government in Montenegro (8%). External influence from the EU and Western countries (USA, UK – 7%), Serbia’s interference in Montenegro’s internal political issues (5%), external influence from Russia (5%), poor transport connections (4%), the Serbian government (4%), the status of Montenegrins in Serbia (3%), the non-extradition of Svetozar Marović to Montenegro by the Serbian government (2%), the absence of diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level (2%), the ban on entry for certain Serbian citizens into Montenegro/Montenegrin citizens into Serbia (1%) are relatively low on the scale of perceived problems, while as much as a fifth have no stance on these issues.
“Although Montenegro’s independence is recognized by the majority in Serbia, there is also a stance that some aspects of the two countries’ affairs should be joint. Noting that respondentscould choose multiple options for this question, a significant number (almost one-third – 32%) suggest that there should be a common foreign and defence policy or economic and financial policy (26%). Interestingly, a small number recognize such an approach when it comes to practical issues, such as transport strategy (10%). On the other hand, 14% believe that Montenegro and Serbia should not have common policies, and that each should take care of their own priorities,” explained Božović.
There is a strong belief that Serbia has the right or an obligation to take care of Serbs in Montenegro – as many as 79% of Serbian citizens hold this view, while only 7% believe it’s an internal matter for Montenegro.
Presenting the research results related to foreign policy, Božović stated that Serbian citizens primarily see Russia as the main pillar in foreign policy (20%), while the EU is in second place with 15%, closely followed by China at 13%. US ranks much lower (9%), along with Montenegro (6%), Germany (5%), UK (4%), and Turkey (3%).
“These findings correspond with the prevailing narrative in most media outlets that distances Serbia from the West. Consequently, and unfortunately, only 38% of Serbian citizens support EU membership, which is the lowest percentage in the Western Balkan region, with the note that the number of those who are against (41%) is twice as large as those who are undecided (21%). Only 9% support joining the NATO, while 75% of respondents oppose it, and 16% cannot make up their minds,” emphasized Božović.
In the section of identity issues, the findings show that only a third (33%) of Serbian citizens recognize the difference of the Montenegrin identity, meaning its distinctiveness from the Serbian identity, while this is not the case for 29% of the respondents, as mentioned by Božović. A significant number of respondents (38%) do not have a stance on this issue.
Montenegrin language is not recognized by 56% of Serbian citizens, while 28% recognize it, and 16% have no opinion on the matter.
“Furthermore, the majority of Serbian citizens (60%) believe that the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) should not interfere in political matters in either Montenegro or Serbia. This confirms the commitment to secularism by Serbian citizens, despite negative occurences in Serbian society originating from the church itself, which the SOC also spreads in the region, specifically towards Montenegro,” Božović elaborated.
Regarding the cultural legacy represented by Njegoš, 65% of Serbian citizens believe that Njegoš is part of both Serbian and Montenegrin cultures, while only 4% see Njegoš as part of the Montenegrin culture exclusively, and just over a fifth (22%) see Njegoš solely as part of the Serbian culture.
Total of 46% of Serbian citizens believe that Serbs in Montenegro are endangered, while 32% hold the opposite view. For those who claim that there is discrimination against Serbs in Montenegro, employment and the practice of religious rights are the areas where they perceive it. On the other hand, 86% of Serbian citizens believe that Montenegrins are not endangered in Serbia.
“It is remarkably interesting that 74% of Serbian citizens state that they supported the religious processions (litije) in Montenegro during 2020, and over 50% of them believe that these precessions had a significant or partial impact on the outcome of the parliamentary elections in August 2020 in Montenegro. At the same time, the majority (45%) would not support such a model of political change in Serbia, i.e. only 24% of Serbian citizens would support this model in Serbia, and 10% partially,” Božović noted.
The Partisan movement still prevails in Serbia, with 32% of those who feel close to it, while the Chetnik movement is right behind with 29%. However, a significant number of citizens have no stance on this issue, as many as 39%.
“Only 16% of Serbian citizens believe that a genocide occurred in Srebrenica, while 52% do not share this view, and a significant 32% either cannot or do not want to take a stance on the matter. The independence of Kosovo is not supported by 73% of Serbian citizens, in contrast to 5% who do support it, with an additional 22% without an opinion on this issue. In the Russian-Ukrainian war, almost two-fifths (39%) of Serbian citizens support Russia, and only 13% support Ukraine. As much as 48% of Serbian citizens have no opinion on this war. As expected from these data, only 12% of Serbian citizens would support sanctions against Russia, while 67% are against it. On the same line, when discussing how dangerous Russian influence is for the region, the majority (48%) believe it is not, but there is also a significant number (37%) of those who think that this influence is malignant and dangerous,” said Božović.
The empirical research in Serbia was conducted by the agency House of Win (HOW) in the period from 2 to 10 October 2023, on a stratified sample of 1,844 respondents, with application of the CATI method.
You can see the results of the research at the following link:
The main goal of the project “Plenum on Montenegrin-Serbian Relations!”is to create a new narrative that promotes respect for good neighbourly relations, religious rights, multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, European values, human rights, and highlights positive examples of efforts by groups and individuals during the wars and crises of the 1990s as true heroes for new generations. Specific objective is to identify the main causes of the complexity of relations between two historically related and close communities – the Serbian and Montenegrin communities – and establish a roadmap towards their significant and sustainable improvement
Chair of the Executive Committee of the Regional Academy for Democratic Development Balsa Bozovic was invited to speak at the 27th Forum 2000 in Prague. He was one of the key speakers at the panel devoted to the situation in Western Balkans. The panel entitled “Lessons from civil society in Western Balkans conflicts” dealt with the most pressing issues in the region.
Persisting ethnic disputes not only undermine stability in the Western Balkans but also create opportunities for nationalist and populist politicians across the region to build up their popularity by instrumentalizing these divisions. The session will focus on possible alternative strategies for the long-term resolution of such conflicts from the perspective of civil society. CSOs’ experience from the ongoing dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, currently the most pressing regional issue, would serve as a case study for developing more general ideas that could be transferred to other post-conflict settings in the Western Balkans and beyond – these are just some of the issues that panel where Mr. Bozovic was a speaker dealt with.
The Forum 2000 was founded in 1996 as a joint initiative of the late Czech President Václav Havel, Japanese philanthropist Yohei Sasakawa, and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Elie Wiesel.
The Forum 2000 conferences and other events organized by the Forum 2000 Foundation are held in Prague, Czech Republic. Since 1997, Forum 2000 organizes an annual conference which has attracted a number of prominent thought leaders, Nobel laureates, former and acting politicians, business leaders and other individuals, whose common denominative is experience with bearing responsibility. Prince Hassan bin Talal, Yohei Sasakawa, Frederik Willem de Klerk, Bill Clinton, Oscar Arias Sánchez, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Henry Kissinger, Shimon Peres, Mario Soares, Hana Suchocká, Shirin Ebadi, Sergey Kovalyov, Nicholas Winton, Madeleine Albright, and Wole Soyinka are just a few of those who have attended the Forum 2000 events.
The Regional Academy for Democratic Development (ADD), in cooperation with the Center for Civic Education from Podgorica (CGO), and with the support of the Embassy of Switzerland, will be hosting a presentation of the public opinion research results on the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro. This event will take place on Friday, October 20, 2023, at the Media Center, Terazije 3, 2nd floor, starting at 12:00 PM.
The presentation aims to shed light on how the citizens of Serbia perceive the relations between Serbia and Montenegro and the future of these two countries. It will address questions such as how the citizens evaluate the relationships with neighboring countries, the problems they identify in the Serbia-Montenegro relationship, and whether they believe Serbia has an influence on internal affairs in Montenegro. Additionally, the presentation will explore who should be the main support for Serbia on the foreign policy front and how the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) is viewed in these relations. It will also delve into whether there are distinctions between the Serbian and Montenegrin identities and how citizens in Serbia determine their values on key issues.
The answers to these and several related questions will be presented and discussed by:
Balša Božović, Executive Director of the Regional Academy for the Development of Democracy (ADD)
A representative from the public opinion research agency, House of Win (HOW)
This research is part of the project “Plenum on Montenegrin-Serbian Relations!” conducted by CGO from Montenegro in collaboration with ADD from Serbia, with financial support from the Embassy of Switzerland. It was simultaneously conducted in both Serbia and Montenegro.
The main goal of the project is to create a new narrative that promotes respect for good neighborly relations, religious rights, multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, European values, human rights, and highlights positive examples of anti-war efforts during the wars and crises of the 1990s as valid guidelines for new generations.
The specific objective of the project is to identify the main causes of the complexity in the relations between two historically connected and close communities – Serbs and Montenegrins – and to establish a roadmap toward their significant and sustainable improvement.
In a shooting that occurred on September 24th in the village of Banjska in northern Kosovo, one police officer of Albanian nationality was killed, while at least two others were injured. Four attackers were killed in the exchange of fire. Balša Božović, the President of the Executive Board of the Academy for the Development of Democracy, stated in an interview with City RTV that President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić knew from the very beginning what was being planned and is the absolute culprit for this terrorist act.
Božović believes that Vučić tried to downplay the recent terrorist act in every possible way, despite the involvement of individuals armed with automatic weapons and various types of vehicles, including off-road and armored ones. Božović pointed out that several wounded individuals had reported to a hospital in Novi Pazar, and the police had not taken any action to investigate or detain them, suggesting a deliberate attempt to allow the events to unfold.
According to Božović, this situation is not new, but the international community still insists on preserving peace at any cost. However, this two-year-long policy has not borne fruit.
Božović explained that similar incidents were visible earlier when some members of the Montenegrin public, particularly those affiliated with Vučić’s regime, were convinced they were being paranoid during the consecration in Cetinje. Božović emphasized the importance of knowing the identity of the armed individuals involved and who sent, armed, and paid them, as well as their intentions.
Under Aleksandar Vučić’s regime, Božović noted that it has become normal to support those who killed a police officer from another country. There is a constant sense of revenge and a narrative suggesting that the situation is not over, implying that others around the world may reconsider their stance on supporting the Albanian leadership in Kosovo. Božović warned that these threats are alarming and indicate that human life is not valued highly by this regime, and it will continue to deal with those who have different opinions, both within and outside of Serbia, in this manner.
Božović believes that tensions will persist as long as Aleksandar Vučić remains in power, not only in Kosovo but also in the broader region. He concludes that the only way to achieve peace in the region is through the democratization of Serbia.
